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It is a great honour for me to address you this afternoon and to celebrate with you the 40th anniversary of the Center for Philosophy of Science. We are celebrating the foundation of an institution that has successfully grown to maturity, achieving national and international fame because of wise policies and unique programs. The Center has considered philosophy of science a discipline that may serve as a juncture for an exchange of ideas concerning knowledge in general and science – the natural and the social – in particular. Conceived in the broadest sense, the discipline has turned in effect to be interdisciplinary, allowing for a wide variety of themes to be proposed and varied ideas to be researched, always however critically discussed with sharp logic and pragmatic common sense.

Center, institution, policies, programs are all abstract entities that do have spatio-temporal concrete features: an office, a desk, a computer and in our case even a cathedral. The point is however that abstract entities within such spatio-temporal frames do not make an institution viable let alone successful. What does make it successful, or for that matter, a failure, is people. The celebration today is first and foremost a salute to people, people like Adolf Grünbaum, Larry Laudan, Nicholas Rescher, Jerry Massey and Jim Lennox who have led and lead the Center from strength to strength negotiating a delicate path between financial constraints and academic politics but always having a clear objective in mind – a philosophy of science which is broad enough to contain a rich variety of themes and ideas, a truly pluralistic conception that can and indeed does enrich the field and make an impact on society. 

The scientific work of Adolf Grünbaum amply exemplifies this approach. Just think of the philosophy of space-time that makes use of knowledge of physics as well as sophisticated logical and mathematical tools; combine it now with a critique of psychoanalysis and its methodological foundation that has to resort at once to studies of scientific method and psychology; not of course to forget Grünbaum’s work on theological interpretations of physical cosmology. The art then is to be vast and various and yet incisive as philosophy demands.

This however is still not enough for a successful institution. Consider the impression that Ruth Manor of the Department of Philosophy, the University of Tel-Aviv, has formed of the Center. As a former visiting fellow, she writes:
The Center offered me again and again a refuge; a perfect setting for working and for placing distance between myself and my Israeli life. First, it is very simple and comfortable to come to Pitt: everything is basically arranged and conducive to work… I should also mention, she continues, how helpful and nice are the staff… In all my connections with anybody associated with the Center…, every request I had was granted. This is a great Center and the best I've seen.
I shall say later more about the Center as a place of retreat especially in view of the Israeli scene; right now I wish to underline the role of people: directors and staff. This observation of Manor confirms clearly, and I personally hasten to join her in that, that salute is due not only to the directors but to the staff as well, the people who attend to the day-to-day needs and problems of the fellows, the details of life that make all the difference. So thank you, Karen Kovalchick and Joyce McDonald.

The Center’s visionary leadership and its attentive staff have proven crucial to its success, but the vision and its execution could all come to a successful fruition only because of the singular contribution of the faculty members of the Department of History and Philosophy of Science and the Department of Philosophy of the University of Pittsburgh. Without their associations and keen interests in the visiting fellows, the Center - in my opinion - would not have attained its objective – to become literally, and let me underline it, literally the Center of philosophy of science. I am thinking especially of Merrilee Salmon and the late Wesley Salmon.

I wish to share with you some personal memories and a few philosophical reflections that clearly demonstrate the working of the Center.

My first sojourn as a visiting fellow of the Center took place in January and February 1996. I met Merrilee and Wes for the first time a few months earlier in Konstanz and was immediately taken by their friendliness and humour, an essentially ironic humour that puts everything in the correct, that is the common sensical, perspective. However, the real surprise awaited me when I arrived in Pittsburgh. Merrilee and Wes came to the airport to pick me up and to introduce me to the town, to the inns and outs around the Cathedral – a wonderful gesture that alleviates the alienating fear of the newcomer. I quickly set down to work in this friendly atmosphere.

For some years a colleague of mine from the psychology department and I have been conducting at the University of Haifa an interdisciplinary seminar on explanation in philosophy and psychology. We habitually begin the seminar with some philosophical reflections on explanation – an analysis of the concept and its philosophical underpinnings. We discuss the various models of explanation that philosophers have defended and proceed to examine explanation in the setting of psychology. We have focused from the outset, not only on the concept itself but also on its application. The objective that we have set for the seminar, attended by students from both departments, Philosophy and Psychology, has been a critical understanding of the concept of explanation, its use and limitations.

We were keen on deepening our understanding of the concept and on exploring its applications in fields of knowledge other than psychology. This was the motivation for convening an international conference on explanation and its application. It was clear to us that we should invite Merrilee and Wes to participate in the conference.

In my second stay in Pittsburgh, summer 1997, I invited Merrilee and Wes to take part in this conference on explanation at my home university, the University of Haifa. It was a real pleasure to learn that they both had accepted the invitation. The conference took place in the spring of 1998 under the auspices of the University of Haifa. Wes contributed to the theoretical aspect of explanation: “Explanation and Confirmation,” and Merrilee to its application: “Explanation in Archaeology.”

At the closing years of the nineteenth century, Heinrich Hertz, the celebrated German experimentalist and theoretician, opened his book, The Principles of Mechanics, with the statement that,
The most direct, and in a sense the most important, problem which our conscious knowledge of nature should enable us to solve is the anticipation of future events, so that we may arrange our present affairs in accordance with such anticipation [(1894) 1956, p. 1]. 
By contrast, at the closing years of the twentieth century, the physicist Nobel laureate, Steven Weinberg insists in his book, Dreams of a Final Theory, that
Once again I repeat: the aim of physics at its most fundamental level is not just to describe the world but to explain why it is the way it is [(1992) 1994, p. 219]? 

Heinrich Hertz and Steven Weinberg – two illustrious physicists separated by a century – exemplify by their respective views of physics one of the crucial transitions in philosophy that this century of science has undergone. We are concerned here with the role assigned to theories, their constituting laws and consequently the criteria by which they are supposed to be compared and evaluated. Should a theory enable us to be solely “in advance of the facts [Hertz (1894) 1956, p. 1],” as Hertz had stipulated or should it aim at what seems to be a rather loftier objective: increasing our understanding of “why… [the world] is the way it is [Weinberg (1992) 1994, p. 219]?,” as Weinberg demanded. The tension is then between on the one hand successful prediction based on appropriate representation of phenomena and on the other hand explanatory power grounded in schemes of explanation.

The apparent transition from mere prediction to explanation is reflected in the growing philosophical interest in the notion of scientific explanation, a notion which Wesley Salmon helped secure and develop.

As the century drew to its close, optimism seemed to prevail. Indeed, Wesley Salmon observed that,
At the end of this century we can seriously argue that, although metaphysics and theology may serve as sources of inspiration or consolation, intellectually illuminating explanations are to be found in the realms of natural science. It is not necessary to depart from science to have genuine understanding of the world and what transpires within it [1998, p. 91].
Without any doubt, Wes should be counted amongst those who contributed to the changing view of the role of explanation in science, especially by divorcing it from prediction and linking it to causality.

It was a great honor and much pleasure to host Merrilee and Wes. As Merrilee noted,
The Conference was the occasion of Wes's and my first trip to Israel. This was a glorious experience for us, both for the intellectual stimulation of the meetings with our colleagues and the warmth of their hospitality [Hon and Rakover 2001, Preface].
I thank Merrilee for her gracious words.

Our suggestion to follow up the conference with a book was immediately accepted. I discussed with Wes the possibility of getting him into a philosophical dialogue with Peter Lipton who too contributed to the conference, defending the viability and indeed the validity of Inference to the Best Explanation, that is an inference which is not framed deductively. Wes and Peter took up the challenge and got into an instructive philosophical dialogue. Wes responded to Peter’s defense of Inference to the Best Explanation with a characteristic title, “Reflections of a Bashful Bayesian”. Bayesianism, so termed after the Eighteenth century English mathematician Thomas Bayes, allows one to combine prior information with new information about a sample to govern a statistical inference. In this rejoinder Wes finds ways to reach a middle ground with Peter. According to Wes, the main point of contention between Peter the explanationist and Wes the Bayesian, is that the explanationist is committed to a greater informational content, while for the Bayesian likeliness is preferred over fertility. Wes however, as I have said, negotiated a middle way and was prepared to trade high probability for greater informational content. He however stressed that explanatory power is not a key to likeliness. In the end, Wes acknowledged the existence of legitimate Inferences to Best Explanations in certain limited contexts, namely, commonsense inferences regarding intentional human behavior. In these contexts, Wes pointed out, we however can hardly say to have scientific explanations.

While the book was in its final stage of publication, we sadly learnt of the tragic death of Wes.

Wes had an extraordinary personality. He was a great philosopher but at the same time humble, humorous and literally in pursuit of the good. He contributed indefatigably valuable philosophical studies that have changed the scene of the philosophy of explanation. These penetrating studies, rich with philosophical insights and illuminating cases from the history of science and written with rare clarity, have transformed the notion of scientific explanation. No one who has come to know Wes in person could have failed to be impressed by the wise and warm aura that his personality radiated. 

This combination of the sharpest philosophical acumen and the highest rectitude is very rare and I feel honored to have come to know Wes in person. We have dedicated the book to the memory of Wes [Hon and Rakover 2001].

I have brought these reminiscences to remember Wes. But they also show how the Center works, how it facilitates for its visiting fellows to get into fruitful discussions with faculty members of the University of Pittsburgh. This is the juncture to thank the Center personally for making it possible for me to get acquainted with Wesley Salmon – a philosopher of the highest rank. 

We have then to salute and thank not only the directors and staff, but the faculty members as well. Indeed, there will be more faculty members to come in my story and in the stories of other Israeli visiting fellows.

There is a clear and uncontroversial distinction between the disciplines of history and philosophy. One encyclopædic definition of history reads: “the discipline that studies the chronological record of events (as affecting a nation or people), based on a critical examination of source materials and usually presenting an explanation of their causes” (Britannica). Philosophy is defined as “the critical examination of the grounds for fundamental beliefs and an analysis of the basic concepts employed in the expression of such beliefs” (Britannica). One possible link between these two distinct disciplines is that philosophical inquiries constitute central elements in the intellectual history of many historical civilizations. But there is another link that goes in the other direction, from history to philosophy, namely that developments of political history may forge and enhance, or for that matter devastate and destroy philosophical developments – political history casts constraints on philosophical progress.

The discipline of philosophy of science as we have come to know it today was forged by the political turmoil of the twentieth century. If we were to attend to the history of philosophy of science in recent time there would be then no escape but to focus our attention on the German speaking countries, essentially Germany and Austria, at the turn of the last century and up to the ascent to power of the Nazi regime. We would then follow the dispersion of the German speaking philosophical community, especially members of the various circles in Berlin and Vienna, and of course those associated with the Vienna Circle itself. This history is not in the remote past and I can clearly imagine that when the Center was founded 40 years ago history was felt fresh in the minds of the people concerned. The immigration to the United States of philosophers from Central Europe who saw themselves as the bearers of scientific philosophy, made a considerable impact on the philosophical scene in the States and indeed on the emergence of philosophy of science as we know it today. This is not the place to trace this story; suffice it to note that Adolf Grünbaum and Nicholas Rescher were doctoral students of Carl Hempel who was in turn, albeit for a short period back in Germany, a student of Hans Reichenbach with whom Wesley Salmon studied once Reichenbach had settled in the United States. It is thus befitting that the Center holds in his Archive the papers of Reichenbach, Carnap, Hempel and Salmon. These collections of papers provide important sources for the understanding of the development of twentieth century philosophy.

As the representative of the Israeli contingent of visiting fellows, I wish to point out that we too are part of this story, but in a twisted way.

It would be an exaggeration and indeed misleading to think that scientific philosophy that evolved into philosophy of science as we know it today, had developed in Israel by the Jewish German scholars who escaped Nazi persecutions. That is, one is tempted to guess that philosophy of science originated in Israel – well, it was Palestine at the time – with the new settlers from Central Europe. To be sure, these immigrants, Jekkes as they are called in Israel (because of their habit to retain the jacket, or Jacke in German, in the scorching heat of the summer), contributed immensely to the development and consolidation of academic institutions in Israel, particularly the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and indeed vouched for their high standard. In fact, a few of these scholars have become, as it were, institutions of their own right; scholars like Gershom Scholem, the historian of the Kabala (who is said to have expressed the view that, “nonsense is nonsense, but the history of nonsense is scholarship” – I thank Bernard Goldstein for the quote); Abraham Fraenkel the mathematician of the Zermelo-Fraenkel set-theory, Shmuel Sambursky the historian of science and Shmuel Hugo Bergmann the philosopher. 

However, philosophy of science did not partake in the story of the migration of German scholarship to Israel. In the early fifties, when the state of Israel was a few years old as an independent state, students like Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, would go to the States to study; in his case it was with Rudolf Carnap, one of the prominent Vienna Circle émigrés. Most if not all of the currently active Israeli philosophers of science have received their training in the Anglo-Saxon tradition and in fact in England or in the States. In an historical twist these young Israelis have gone to study in those places of learning where the persecuted philosophers chose to settle – England and the United States. In my own case, I owe my training to the University of London and my philosophical education to Heinz Post. The son of a famous Viennese radiologist who was sacked by the Nazis in 1933 from his position at the University of Königsberg, Post settled in England, having received his training in Oxford and Chicago. He then founded in the sixties a Department for History and Philosophy of Science at the University of London combining forces with philosophers like Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend. It was my good fortune to attend his seminars in the 1970’s that bore striking resemblance, according to reliable witnesses, to the way seminars had been conducted in Berlin and Vienna before National Socialism annihilated the free spirit of scholarship. Against the background of English hierarchical class society, Post used to say to me that, “we, foreigners, are lucky; we are out of the snob scale.” For me, an Israeli student reading philosophy of science, to hear that in London from a prominent philosopher of science who had emigrated to England from Austria – for me, that captured it all.

But to return to the Israeli scene: it seems to me that the flourishing interest in philosophy of science in Israel is connected on the one hand to the long standing Jewish inclination towards conceptual, abstract thinking, and on the other hand to the development of the sciences. Lately, there has been a growing interest in the history and philosophy of science as a means of informing the teaching of the sciences. This I think is a general trend and it strengthens our confidence that history and philosophy of science does not, as it were, keep to itself; it does have a bearing on society, for example, as an educational means.

There are seven academic institutions in Israel, not to count the many newly founded colleges. The Hebrew University in Jerusalem; the University of Tel-Aviv and Bar-Ilan in Tel-Aviv and Ramat-Gan respectively; then in Rehovot, the Weizmann Institute of Science; the University of Haifa as well as the Technion – Israel Institute of Technology in Haifa, then in Beer-Sheva, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev and finally the Open University. At the Hebrew University there is a program for History and Philosophy of Science which is affiliated to the Edelstein Center for History and Philosophy of Science, Technology, and Medicine and to the Department of Philosophy. Thanks to the initiative of Yehuda Elkana, the University of Tel-Aviv founded its own Institute: the Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas. The institute is affiliated to the School of History. There is in the faculty of Humanities in Tel-Aviv, a Department of Philosophy in which faculty members pursue actively themes in philosophy of science. At both Ben-Gurion University and the University of Haifa various courses in philosophy of science are conducted in the respective philosophy departments and there have been recently attempts to introduce programs for the history and philosophy of science. Bar-Ilan has developed its own program for the History and Philosophy of Science within the framework of its Interdisciplinary Studies.

A couple of years ago, it was felt that in view of the growing interest in the discipline an Israeli Association for the History and Philosophy of Science should be formed. An association has indeed been founded and the number of subscription reaches some 100 members. The Bar-Hillel colloquium which alternates once a month between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv during the semester-time, provides a convenient venue for meeting and discussion. A recent guest of the Bar-Hillel colloquium was Adolf Grünbaum. In December 1999, he spoke at this venue in Tel-Aviv on the theme: “Theological Misinterpretations of Current Physical Cosmology.”

This is a convenient juncture to turn our attention to the Israeli former visiting-fellows of the Center, to report on the work they carried out at the Center and the experience they have had. With this report I wish to demonstrate the success of the visiting fellow program with respect to each individual as well as the effect of the program on the local Israeli philosophy of science scene.

There have been all in all seven Israeli visiting fellows at the Center. This is a considerable contingent of fellows, given the size of the population. Two former fellows are currently in Tel-Aviv, four are active at the Department of Philosophy, the University of Haifa, and another former visiting fellow has been recently hired by the University of Maryland, Baltimore County. 

The first Israeli visiting fellow of the Center is Dan Nesher. He had his fellowship in 1980-81, shortly after the inception of the visiting program in 1977. Since his visit in the early 80’s Dan has returned to the Center on a few occasions as indeed many other fellows have done. During his first sojourn, he studied the philosophy of the American philosopher Chales Sanders Peirce, especially his theory of signs. Dan developed it further into a theory of cognitive meaning of non-verbal as well as verbal languages. This was the basis for much of his work that evolved in the 80’s. He discussed his work mostly with Grünbaum, Laudan and Rescher. In the early 90’s this work started to shape up into his pragmatic theory of truth which he now presents in a book form consisting of some ten essays. He reports that his work is not in the tradition of contemporary philosophy of science but it deals with its foundations: questions as to common and scientific knowledge and the true representation of external reality. His book thus deals inter alia with the pragmaticist’s conceptions of fact and the nature of true proposition. He presented these results in an essay entitled, “Our Knowledge of External Reality,” at the Center in March 2000. Here he deals with concepts like facts and truth-conditions, for which he seeks philosophical explication.

In Dan’s view, it was his studies of Peirce at the Center in the early 1980’s that provided the basis for his philosophical work on the pragmatic theory of truth. Recently, while a visiting scholar at the Department of Philosophy, the University of Pittsburgh, he discussed this theory at the Center and presented it last year at the meeting of the Fourth International Fellows Conference in San Carlos de Bariloche, Argentina.

He explicitly acknowledges the influence that Grünbaum, Rescher and the late Salmon have had on him. He also notes the role of the younger generation whom he finds “deep and comprehensive philosophers…, very amiable and friendly.” Dan writes that he is very much appreciative of the interest they have taken in his work.

I have already mentioned Ruth Manor of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Tel-Aviv. She was at the Center during the year 1990-91, working on a semantics of vagueness: “Only the bald are bald,” she entitled the resulting paper. She also worked on a paper on feminist philosophy with the enticing title, “Alas, the empress has no clothes, either.” Ruth visited the Center again in summer 1996, working on fallacies and again in 2000. She then wrote her contribution to the Dascal Festschrift, “On the meaning and use of semantics and pragmatics.”

Ruth observes, as I have already indicated, that the Center provides some kind of a retreat. “In many respects,” she writes,
it is hard to work in Israel, mainly because of the high intensity of life – it is full of sidurim [errands] and emergencies, as well as the emotional intensity of the political situation and our natural involvement in political activities. 
As an Israeli and knowing the scene from within, I can alas vouch for this harsh and true description of academic life in Israel. The Center provides then a haven for clearing one’s mind and charging batteries in insightful conversations. Ruth reports that she was directly in touch with Belnap, Rescher, Massey, Grünbaum, and both Merrilee and the late Wes Salmon.

In her visit last summer she began a new project: the philosophy of medicine. The leading questions have to do not with the fashionable theme of medical and bio-ethics, but rather with the methodology of clinical practices. In her view the issues are extremely important both on the theoretical level and on practical grounds. She reports that the Center enabled her to dig, so to speak, into the rich depositories of the libraries of the University of Pittsburgh. She thanks the Center heartily for facilitating interdisciplinary researches. “This is invaluable,” she concludes.

Aaron Kantorovich of the University of Tel Aviv visited the Center in the Fall of 1989. He was then at the preliminary stages of his book on scientific discovery. Kantorovich questions whether there is logic or method to scientific discovery. He analyzes discovery within the framework of evolutionary epistemology. Thus he treats knowledge as a phenomenon in its own right having psychological and social dimensions. He views science as a continuation of the evolutionary process whereby creative discovery plays a role similar to blind mutation in biological evolution. From this perspective, serendipity and tinkering are key notions in throwing light on the creative process. His book, Scientific Discovery: Logic and Tinkering, was published in 1993. He has pursued this theme further with more publications.

Following stimulating discussions at the Center, he became interested in scientific realism, laws of nature and the philosophy of particle physics. He has recently completed a paper on the priority of symmetries in particle physics.

He stresses that his stay at the Center contributed a lot to his work. In particular, he enjoyed discussions with Bruce Buchanan, Jerry Massey and Sam Richmond. He thus thinks that the Center, with its rich activity, may be considered the “Mecca” of the philosophy of science.

Jonathan Berg – who teaches logic, philosophy of language and analytical philosophy at the Department of Philosophy, the University of Haifa – studied as a visiting fellow features of natural language by which it is possible to substitute terms in propositions that make knowledge or belief claims. These features and their problematic use in psychological explanation provided Jonathan with the ground for a book on the issue of direct belief in which he is presently engaged.

He reports that he was in touch with all the other visiting fellows of his time, with many of the resident fellows, some philosophy graduate students and also with several Pitt faculty members who are not associated with the Center. The Center provided him with a comfortable, encouraging, stimulating environment in which he could carried out his research, and a rich network of colleagues with similar interests with whom he has since then kept in touch.

“In my mind,” he remarks, “the Center stands out as a unique force in the advancement of the philosophy of science around the world.”

Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, another former visiting fellow of the Center who is a member of the Department of Philosophy, the University of Haifa, was elected Rector last year. That shows that philosophers are not only in the business of luft Geschäft. Moreover, Ben-Ze’ev claims that he actually practices his philosophy in handling the business of the university. His area of expertise is the philosophy of emotion and his book, The subtlety of emotions, is apparently useful and practical.

Ben-Ze’ev presents in his book an overall conceptual framework for understanding emotions. He looks at the typical characteristics and components of emotions, distinguishes emotions from other affective phenomena, classifies the emotions, and covers such related issues as emotional intelligence, regulating emotions, and emotions and morality. He then proceeds to discuss individual emotions, including envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, pity, compassion, anger, hate, disgust, love, sexual desire, happiness, sadness, pride, regret, and shame.

He reports that his work on emotion began in 1989 when he was a visiting fellow of the Center. His studies with Grünbaum and Rescher were instrumental in setting him on this successful path of research. Ben-Ze’ev has pursued the idea of establishing a linkage between the so-called “hard” and “soft” sciences and thus the implementation of methodologies from the hard sciences in philosophy and psychology. By way of illustration, he has been recently engaged in constructing a scheme of logic of emotion.

This interdisciplinary approach, of bringing methods and ideas from other disciplines to the area one is interested in, is clearly a characteristic of the Center, and Ben-Ze’ev is vigorously engaged in promoting this approach at the University of Haifa. As the Rector of the university he cultivates interdisciplinary policies especially in view of the fact that this university prides itself of having the largest Arab student body in Israel and at the same time the most active university in Israel to be engaged in absorption programs of new young immigrants – Ethiopians and Russians. Thus the university searches for new interdisciplinary programs in Education, Teaching and Teacher Training. There are already interdisciplinary programs in philosophy and psychology and jurisprudence and philosophy. A new program of computer science and philosophy will be inaugurated this coming academic year. Pursuing this policy in his own field of expertise, Ben-Ze’ev has founded at the University of Haifa a Center for the Interdisciplinary Research of Emotions.

We can see here clearly the effect of ideas, coming as they are from philosophical, abstract thinking and getting implemented in the brass tacks of the daily routine of university life. The Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science can see its seeds coming to fruition not only in pure, abstract philosophical thinking but also in the concrete social and political life of the students at the University of Haifa.

A recent visiting fellow to the Center who comes also from Haifa is Joseph Berkovitz. With his work we return to the abstract and imaginative realm of philosophy. More specifically, to philosophy of physics, which is probably the strongest subject of the Center.

Berkovitz’s research in the Center focused on the philosophy of quantum mechanics. He investigated the nature of non-local influences between distant systems in the quantum realm and whether these non-local influences are compatible with the special theory of relativity. He also worked on causal inference, that is, inference from statistical data to causal hypotheses. His research resulted in an extended published paper on quantum non-locality and two studies on closed causal loops in the quantum realm and on causal inference which he presented in international meetings.

At the Center he had discussions with Adolf Grünbaum, Nuel Belnap, John Earman, John Norton, Merrillee and the late Wesley Salmon, and especially Rob Clifton as well as Teddy Seidenfeld from the Carnegie Mellon University. He was also engaged in conversation with other visiting fellows of the Center, in particular, Fred Kronz from the University of Texas at Austin and Bob Meyers from SUNY at Albany, as well as a few graduate students.

Berkovitz attended a number of seminars, in particular John Earman's seminar on laws of nature, Rob Clifton's seminar on mathematical methods in physics, and John Norton's course “Einstein for Everyone”.

Berkovitz observes that the Center has played an important role in his intellectual development and the progress of his career. The Center enabled him to develop his research and at the same time to secure a job as an Assistant Professor at the London School of Economics before moving to the University of Maryland.

He has kept in touch with the Center. In fact, he is currently a Center Associate Fellow. He has also been in close contact with another former visiting fellow, Fred Kronz, with whom he is engaged in writing a paper on chaos theory.

Together with the Department of History and Philosophy of Science and the Philosophy Department, the Center according to Berkovitz is probably the strongest institute in the philosophy of natural sciences and as such has an important contribution to make to the discipline. In fact, with respect to the philosophy of physics the Center and the two departments constitute the leading institute in the subject and it comes as no surprise that the editorial board of the prestigious Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics has moved to Pittsburgh from Cambridge, consisting of Rob Clifton, John Earman and John Norton.

Allow me now to indulge briefly in reporting on my own visits to the Center. I had the good fortune of visiting the Center twice for two months period each. In my first sojourn I worked on the notion of experiment as an argument, developing further my study of experimental error. “’If This Be Error’: Probing Experiment With Error,” is the title of the resulting paper which I presented at a workshop on experimentation in Germany and at the Third International Center Fellows Conference in Castilioncello, Italy. 

I suggested a general method of inquiry. The method consists in studying the nature of possible errors in claims to knowledge within a certain system. The study of error, I argued, reveals the essential features of the system concerned. 

For example, according to Descartes, the reason for the occurrence of errors is due to the sole fact that,
since the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding, I do not restrain it within the same bounds, but extend it also to things which I do not understand: and as the will is of itself indifferent to these, it easily falls into error [1973, pp. 175-76]. 
The crucial philosophical innovation of this theory of error is the introduction of free will into the process of establishing knowledge. This is of course much in line with Descartes’ general epistemological outlook in which the will plays an essential role. The Fourth Meditation from which this quotation is taken, is characteristically devoid of any example or illustration of error. Descartes is interested solely in the mechanism that brings about error. His theory of error provides thus a direct and immediate insight into his system of philosophy.

I implemented this method of error probing in experimentation. Like any philosophical system, experimentation too is a method designed for securing knowledge. I claimed then that the kinds of error that may arise in experimentation lay bare the elements and structure of experiment. I proposed a typology of experimental errors which reflects the kind of argument that is involved in securing physical knowledge. 

Working on this project, I benefited from the advice and fruitful suggestions of Gerald Massey, John Norton and Allen Janis. My fellow visitors to the Center, Paulo Abrantes, Milos Arsenijevic, Eduardo Flichman and Gurol Irzik turned out to be a very critical and helpful readership which offered many instructive remarks.

In my second sojourn I had written a follow up paper which I then presented at what is called the PK4. This is not a Himalayan peak, but rather the meeting of the Pittsburgh-Konstanz groups, in this case the 4th meeting: Science at Century’s End: Philosophical Questions on the Progress and Limits of Science. The Pittsburgh-Konstanz co-operation is one of the many fruitful international co-operations that the Center has initiated. The meetings alternates between Pittsburgh and Konstanz biannually and I trust you will hear more about this co-operation in the next talk of this Anniversary Series, “Uneasy Homecoming: Philosophy of Science in Germany,” which will be delivered next month by Prof. Dr. Gereon Wolters of the University of Konstanz. 

But to return to my contribution to the PK4: I questioned there the effective use of the method of experimentation in biophysics, suspecting that the notion of state which is so vital to experimentation and taken over from physics may lead astray when living systems are experimented upon. The claim is that the disintegration of the distinction between structure and function in biological systems may undermine the validity of the application of the notion of state in such systems. This paper, “The Limits of Experimental Method: Experimenting on an Entangled System – The Case of Biophysics,” is now published in the volume that Martin Carrier, Jerry Massey and Laura Reutsche edited. I gratefully thank the organizers of the meeting, Nicholas Rescher and Gereon Wolters, for inviting me to the Fourth Meeting of the Pittsburgh-Konstanz Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science.

Looking back at those four month I spent at the Center, I cannot but be amazed how much work can be done when facilities are conducive to research and one is away from the turmoil of life in Israel; but more than that, as I have stressed throughout my presentation this afternoon, it’s the people who make all the difference. At the Center there is always someone at hand to help you get over sticking philosophical points. In my case, I wish to mention again Allen Janis and John Norton who were most considerate in listening to my difficulties and suggesting ways out of the maze. I am also very much indebted to Bernard Goldstein for his constant encouragement and support not to mention his incisive criticism and instructive comments on my work. Bernie took much interest in the work I did at the Center and I wish to acknowledge with gratitude his advice and support.

So these are the visits that Israeli philosophers made to the Center. To recapitulate the themes that have been addressed: Peirce’s theory of sign and pragmatic theory of truth, semantics of vagueness, feminist philosophy, semantics and pragmatics, philosophy of medicine, scientific discovery, philosophy of particle physics, philosophy of language and its bearing on explanations in psychology, philosophy of emotions, philosophy of quantum mechanics, causal inference, philosophy of experiment and critique of the experimental method.

I have looked at the visits of seven Israeli philosophers and I think the emerging picture is indeed vast and various. I do not doubt it that upon their return to their home institute, the visiting fellows bring with them new ideas and new works to present to their colleagues and students. Clearly this process is rich and enriching. 

But there are also the visits that were made from here to there – to Israel. I have already mentioned the visit of Merrilee and the late Wes Salmon in which they took part in an international conference on explanation staged by the University of Haifa. Then I mentioned Adolf Grünbaum’s visit during which he gave a talk at Tel-Aviv and Haifa and further in Jerusalem where he received the honor of presenting the opening plenary lecture at the conference: Freud at the Threshold of the 21st Century. Grünbaum questioned whether Freudian theory resolves “the paradoxes of irrationality”? And then there have been visits by John Norton and Peter Machamer, Ted McGuire and a few others. Clearly, the visiting fellow program is not a one-way system. I do hope that the faculty members who are associated with the Center find the encounter with the Israeli scene as fruitful as we do with the scene in the Cathedral.

The complex network of ideas, intellectual co-operations and social ties which I have portrayed, present the connection of the Center with one country and a small one at that. Extrapolate now this report and take a broader perspective and you get a center which is literally the Center, the hub of philosophy of science. The Center has been host to about 200 philosophers, historians, and scientists from 32 countries around the globe.

The development of the Center into the hub of philosophy of science has much to do, in my view, with the inauguration of the Visiting Fellows program in 1977 and its expansion in the 1980’s. The program has transformed the Center into a major force in philosophy of science by linking it firmly to the international scene. Moreover, I find the policy of promoting interdisciplinary works within the framework of philosophy of science to be crucial for the success of the program and the Center. As the case of philosophy of science in Israel indicates, the invitation of philosophers with professional interests in the philosophy of science or in philosophically informed history or sociology of science helps secure new insights into the sciences that may be shared internationally for the good of the people. In this context I wish to underline explicitly the official Center’s credo. In its Mission Statement, it states that: 
The Center is dedicated to bridging the gulf between the sciences and the humanities and to helping to develop and disseminate a philosophical understanding and appreciation of the sciences. The Center pursues its mission not only locally and regionally, but also nationally and internationally. 
I hope I have convinced you with my assessment of the case of philosophy of science in Israel that this Mission Statement is not just words. It carries strength which bears on the personal development of the visiting fellow and thereby on his or her home institute.

In conclusion, let me return once again to the first decades of the last century, when much were proposed, forged and advanced that have actually shaped the features of our present life. Examining the philosophical scene, it has been remarked that in these first decades the systematic unity of the Kantian scheme in which all forms of thought had been the expression of one and the same reason was beginning to shatter. As Michael Friedman persuasively argues, philosophy was torn asunder by Carnap holding fast to formal logic as the ideal of universal validity and Heidegger cutting himself off from logic and exact scientific thinking. According to Friedman, this tension subsists at the heart of the opposition between “analytical” and “continental” philosophical traditions. The opposing views reached a total estrangement with the National Socialist seizure of power in 1933 and the resulting intellectual migration. Friedman calls this development: “a parting of the ways” [2000, pp. 154-157]. 

It is of course tempting to play on the words circle and center, and to think of the Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science as a latter-day Circle of Scientific Philosophy. This, in my view, will be a misleading image and a gross misunderstanding of the working of the Center. The Center whose 40th anniversary we are celebrating today, does not function as a latter-day Viennese Circle. As I hope my assessment demonstrates, the Center paves ways. It’s the “paving ways” and indeed the ways that have been paved that have made the Center the successful institution that it is.
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